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The Perils of Antitrust Proliferation:
The Globalization of Antitrust and the Risks of
Overregulation of Competitive Behavior
Damien Geradin*
I. INTRODUCTION
As Einer Elhauge and I noted in the preface to our recently published
casebook, modern antitrust law is global antitrust law.' This is not so much
because large corporations are subject to global antitrust rules, but because their
behavior is being reviewed under the antitrust rules of an ever-growing number
of jurisdictions. While the last six decades have seen repeated unsuccessful
attempts to develop global antitrust rules,2 the 1980s and 1990s witnessed
significant growth in the number of countries adopting antitrust law statutes and
setting up specialized antitrust agencies and/or courts.' Some one hundred
countries currently have antitrust rules in place, and the process has not ended
yet. On August 1, 2008, China's Anti-Monopoly Law ("AML') entered into
Damien Geradin, Partner, Howrey LLP and Professor of competition law and economics at Tilburg
University, The Netherlands. Thanks to David Henry for his research assistance.
I See Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, GlobalAnitrust Law and Economics 3 (Foundation 2007).
2 The setting up of global antitrust rules was first attempted through the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, UN Doc E/Conf 2/78 (1948) ("Havana Charter"), available online at
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/havana-e.pdf> (visited Apr 16, 2009). The Charter,
however, never entered into force. For a discussion of the story behind the Havana Charter, see Susan
A. Aaronson, Trade and the American Dream 86-91 (Kentucky 1996). Later attempts at setting up such
rules have also foundered. See id at rn 16-17.
3 See, for example, Israel's Restrictive Trade Practices Law, 5748-1988, 42 LSI 135 (1987-1988) (Isr);
Kenya's Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act, (1990) Cap 504 (Kenya); the
Cypriot Protection of Competition Law, PI 207/2000; Polish Act of Feb 16, 2007, on Competition
and Consumer Protection, DzU 2007 No 50, item 331; Italy's Competition and Fair Trading Act,
Gazz Uff del 13 Oct 1990, n 240; the Taiwanese Fair Trade Act of 1992, Faigui Huiban, art 1
(amended 2002); and Vietnam's Competition Law 2005, No 27/2004/QHll (Vietnam).
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force,4 and various factors indicate that China will become a significant actor on
the global antitrust scene.5 As a result, a typical merger between large US
corporations now ordinarily requires approval not just in the US, but also in the
EU, Canada, Brazil, South Africa, Russia, Korea, and the numerous other
jurisdictions that have merger control rules and in which the activities of such
corporations may produce market effects.' Similarly, international cartels may
trigger administrative, civil, or even criminal investigations not only in the US,
but also in a range of other jurisdictions.7 The Microsoft cases bear testimony to
the fact that firms engaging in certain practices, such as refusal to license or
tying, may end up being condemned for abuse of dominance under the antitrust
laws of different nations and, as a result, face a variety of remedies that are not
necessarily consistent.' Thus, businessmen, lawyers and policymakers can no
4 See Fan Longduan [Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Aug 30, 2007 and effective Aug 1, 2008)
("AML"), available online at <http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.htm>
(visited Apr 16, 2009), English translation available online at
<http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FD1-EN/Laws/GeneraLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/P02007101 2
533593599575.pdf> (visited Apr 16, 2009). For a good discussion of China's competition law regime,
see Zhenguo Wu, Perspectives on the Chinese Ani-Monopoly Law, 75 Antitrust LJ 73 (2008).
5 For example, in November 2008, the Chinese antitrust authority rendered its first decision under its
newly adopted antitrust law, imposing remedies on the concentration between InBev and Anheuser-
Busch. See Ron Knox, China Puts Conditions on InBev Deal, 12 Global Competition Review 44 (Nov 18,
2008).
6 For example, over sixty countries have premerger filing requirements.
7 See, for example, the Marine Hose Cartel conspiracy between executives of a number of companies to
rig bids, fix prices, and allocate markets in the supply of marine hoses. The case involved closely
coordinated action between the US Department of Justice, the European Commission, and the UK
Office of Fair Trading. As far as the US case was concerned, the relevant executives agreed to plead
guilty to charges in the US and to serve prison sentences and pay fines. See US Dept of Justice, Press
Release, British Marine Hose Manufacturer Agrees to Plead Guily and Pay $4.5 Million for Particpatiog in
Worldwide Bid-rgging Conspirafy (Dec 1, 2008), available online at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/pubic/pressreleases/2008/239884.htm> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
Subsequently, the executives were sentenced to imprisonment in the UK for between two and a half
to three years for cartel offences. See UK Office of Fair Trading, Press Release, Three Imprisoned in First
OFT Criminal Prosecution for Bid Rigging (une 11, 2008), available online at
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2008/72-08> (visited Apr 16, 2009). In addition, the European
Commission has recently sent a statement of objections to alleged participants in the Marine Hose
Cartel. See Memorandum from the European Commission, Commission Confirms Sending Statement of
Objections to Alleged Participants in a Marine Hoses Cartel, MEMO/08284 (May 5, 2008), available online at
<htp://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/284&format=HTML&aged
=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
8 Microsoft faced antitrust scrutiny by the EU, US, and South Korea. As far as the EU is concerned, see
Commission Decision Relating to a Proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty, Case
COMP/C3/37.792 Microsoft, C(2004)900 final (Mar 24, 2004). The decision was later upheld by the
Court of First Instance in Microsoft v Commission, Case T201/04, 2004 ECR II 271 (2004). At the time
of the Commission decision, Microsoft had, however, already reached settlement in US proceedings
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longer content themselves with understanding only the antitrust law of their
nation. They must also be conversant in the laws of other regimes that form part
of the overall legal framework that regulates competitive behavior.
Like many other scholars,9 I have supported"0 and even contributed" to the
development and adoption of antitrust law regimes in a growing number of
jurisdictions. In recent years, however, my significant involvement in cases
dealing with the application of antitrust laws and the participation of authorities
from several jurisdictions has given me firsthand experience into some of the
pitfalls of the decentralized globalization of antitrust. This decentralization
process has taken place over the last few decades as a result of the concomitant
failure of nations or international organizations to develop a global antitrust law
regime and the decisions of many nations to adopt their own antitrust laws.
While the notion of decentralized globalization may sound like an oxymoron, it
represents an attempt to describe the fact that antitrust is today a global
(see US Dept of Justice, Press Release, Department of Justice and Microsoft Corporation Reach Effective
Settlement on Antitrust Lawsuit (Nov 2, 2001), available online at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/pubic/pressreleases/2001/9463.htm> (visited Apr 16, 2009)), whilst
on February 24, 2006, the Korea Fair Trade Commission ("KFTC") imposed corrective orders on
Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Korea for their abuse of market dominance.
As far as remedies are concerned, in the US Microsoft was required to (1) disclose application
programming interfaces that would permit software developers to interoperate with the Windows
operating system with less difficulty, and (2) disclose protocols that it employed to control
communication between desktop PCs and servers. In the EU, as far as interoperability was concerned,
Microsoft was required, within 120 days, to disclose complete and accurate interface documentation
that would allow non-icrosoft work group servers to achieve full interoperabifity with Windows PCs
and servers. As regards to tying, Microsoft was required, within 90 days, to offer to PC manufacturers
a version of its Windows client PC operating system without Windows Media Player. Furthermore, the
Commission imposed a fine on Microsoft of €497 million. For a good discussion of the remedies
imposed on Microsoft in both the EU and US, see Harry First, Netscape is Dead: Remedy Lessons from the
Microsoft Litigation, working paper no 08-49, NYU Center for L, Econ & Org (2008), available online at
<http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1260803> (visited Apr 16, 2009). In Korea,
the KFTC required Microsoft to unbundle tied products and install Media Center and Messenger
Center through which download links to competitors are provided. Furthermore, a fine of 32.49
billion won was levied. See Microsoft Case (unpublished document), available online at
<http://eng.ftc.go.kr/files/bbs/2008/MS/ 2OCase(06.10.).doc> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
See, for example, Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, and Sideways, 75
NYU L Rev 1781 (2000); D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of
InternationalAntitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 Berkeley Bus L J 37 (2007).
10 See Damien Geradin, Competition Law and Regional Economic Integration: An Analysis of the Southern
Mediterranean Countries (World Bank 2004).
11 For several years prior to entering private practice, I worked as a consultant for the "Private
Participation in Mediterranean Infrastructures" program cosponsored by the European Commission
and the World Bank. One of the objectives of this program was to induce Mediterranean nations to
engage in regulatory reforms, including the adoption of antitrust laws and the setting up of antitrust
authorities.
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phenomenon, not through the adoption of supranational rules, such as in areas
pertaining to environmental protection,12 labor rights, 3 or human rights, 4 but
through the adoption of national rules often varying in scope, objectives,
methods, and enforcement methodology.
There is no doubt that the adoption of antitrust rules in a larger number of
nations generates benefits, as it allows, for instance, these nations to protect
their citizens against international cartels or excessive market concentration. This
process has, however, also given rise to challenges for global corporations, some
of which are well known. The decentralized globalization of antitrust increases:
(1) the cost of doing business and the complexity of large-scale antitrust
investigations, which now often have a multi-jurisdictional component; (2) the
risk of contradictory decisions where a firm's behavior is reviewed by different
antitrust authorities under different sets of rules; and (3) the likelihood that some
decisions will be guided by protectionist motives.
The objective of this Article is to raise awareness of a particular problem:
in a world where the conduct of a firm is subject to different antitrust regimes,
the most restrictive antitrust regime always wins. In other words, the firm in
question will be required to ensure that its conduct conforms to whichever
regime is most restrictive. The result is global antitrust over-enforcement. As will
be seen, this issue, which I refer to as the "strictest regime wins" problem, may
lead to situations where the decision of an antitrust authority in one jurisdiction
(for instance, taking a negative decision on conduct that is otherwise considered
to be procompetitive) may deprive consumers in other jurisdictions of various
efficiencies that are well-recognized by their own antitrust authorities. This
Article also draws attention to a number of procedural issues, which may
negatively impact the ability of corporations investigated in foreign jurisdictions
to defend their case.
Against this background, this Article is divided into five sections. Section II
describes the process of decentralized globalization alluded to above. Section III
discusses the various benefits brought about by the adoption of antitrust regimes
12 See, for example, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
Atlantic (1992), 31 ILM 1312 (1993); Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (1997), 37 ILM 22 (1998).
13 See, for example, the Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organize (1948), 68 UN Treaty Ser 17; Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of
the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively (1949), 96 UN Treaty Set 257.
14 See, for example, the United Nations Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1985), 24 ILM 535; United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child (1989), 18 ILM 1448.
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in an increasingly large number of nations, as well as the challenges that this has
created for multinational corporations. Section IV focuses on the problem of
global antitrust over-enforcement described above. Finally, Section V provides a
short conclusion.
II. THE DECENTRALIZED GLOBALIZATION OF ANTITRUST
Since the Second World War, various attempts have been made in the
context of trade negotiations to develop multilateral antitrust rules. By 1947, the
Havana Charter and the International Trade Organization ("ITO')
contemplated such rules, envisaging a chapter containing provisions for the
regulation of restrictive business practices. 5 The ITO failed, however, in part
because of objections of the US to its antitrust policy provisions. No antitrust-
related rules were subsequently included in the original General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Discussions over multilateral antitrust rules continued in a
variety of international fora. For instance, in the early 1950s, the UN Economic
and Social Council attempted to formulate an international agreement on
restrictive business practices, which was also rejected by the US.' 6 In the 1970s,
developing countries decided to pursue the negotiation of a multilateral code on
restrictive business practices. These efforts led to the adoption in 1980 of a "Set
of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices."' 7 The practical importance of this code,
however, was limited by its purely voluntary nature.
While efforts to develop binding international antitrust rules remain
fruitless, many states have engaged in bilateral cooperation agreements."
Pursuant to these agreements, the parties agree to cooperate in the context of
international antitrust investigations (for example, by providing that each party
notify the other of a pending enforcement action that could impact important
interests of the other party). 9 Some of these agreements also identify a set of
negative and positive comity principles that can guide both parties as they decide
15 See Havana Charter, ch 5 (cited in note 2).
16 Diane P. Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real International Antitrust, 1992 U Chi Legal F 277, 284-85
(1992).
17 Id at 285-87.
18 See, for example, Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws,
(1991), 30 ILM 1491.
19 Id, art II.
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whether to exercise or forgo jurisdiction. 20 These agreements do not lead,
however, to any coordination of substantive antitrust laws. In the absence of
multilateral competition rules, some nations also started to coordinate their
competition policy on a regional basis. Examples include the EU,2' the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 22 and Mercosur.
23
In the 1990s, internationalization of antitrust rules remained at the
forefront of international trade discussions. The EU in particular pressed its
trading partners for the adoption of a competition law framework in the context
of the World Trade Organization ("WTO").24 This approach was supported by
some major trading nations. It was, however, opposed by the US.25 As a result,
while the Uruguay Round negotiations led to the adoption of specific
agreements over issues, such as intellectual property rights ("TRIPS") and
international investments ("TRIMs"), these negotiations did not lead to the
adoption of global antitrust rules. Several agreements that are part of the WTO
framework, however, contain antitrust-related provisions. For instance, TRIPS
authorizes members to specify, in their legislation or licensing practices,
conditions that may, in particular cases, constitute an abuse of intellectual
property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.
26
TRIMs requires, within five years from the date on which it becomes
enforceable, consideration of whether the agreement should be complemented
with provisions on investment and competition policy.
27
20 See, for example, id, arts V and VI. In this context, see also Agreement between the European
Community and the Government of Japan Concerning Cooperation on Anticompetitive Activities,
arts V and VI, 2003 OJ (L 183) 12, 14-15; Agreement between the European Communities and the
Government of Canada Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, 1999 OJ (L 175) 50.
21 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, title VI, 2002 OJ (C
325) 33, 64-70 ("Treaty Establishing the EC"); Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of December 16,
2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty,
2003 OJ (L 1) 1.
22 See North American Free Trade Agreement (1993), chapter 15, 32 ILM 605.
23 See Decisi6n No 18/96, Protocolo de la Defensa de la Competencia, available online at
<http://www.cancilleria.gov.ar/comercio/mercosur/normativa/decision/1l996/decl896.html>
(visited Apr 16, 2009); Decisi6n No 02/97, Anexo al Protocolo Defensa de la Competencia, available
online at <http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MRCSRS/Decisions/DEC297.asp> (visited Apr 16,
2009).
24 See Eleanor M. Fox, Toward WorldAntitrust and Market Access, 91 AmJ Intl L 1, 8-9 (1997).
25 Id at 10-11.
26 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art 40, 33 ILM 1197, 1213 (1994) ("TRIPS').
See also id, art 8.
27 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, reprinted in Uruguay Round Trade Agreement,
Statement of Administrative Action 1, art 9, HR Doc 316, 103d Cong, 1448 (1994).
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In 1996, the WTO Ministerial Meeting, held in Singapore, created a
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy.
28
The mission of this Working Group was to "study issues raised by Members
relating to the interaction between trade and competition policy, including
anticompetitive practices, in order to identify any areas that might merit further
consideration in the WTO framework., 29 This Working Group produced several
reports supporting further WTO initiatives in the antitrust field. The 2001 Doha
Ministerial Declaration provided that negotiations over competition would take
place after the next WTO Ministerial Meeting based on modalities to be decided
at the time.30 Such negotiations were cut short by the issuance of the August
2004 Decision by the General Council of the WTO, which stated that the
"Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy" would not form part of
the Doha Work Program.3 Since then, no other initiatives have been taken
towards the adoption of global antitrust rules.
While these efforts to develop global antitrust rules have been
unsuccessful, since the Second World War a large number of nations have
adopted antitrust laws. The Treaty of Rome, which was adopted in 1957 by the
six founding Member States of the EU (which now comprises twenty-seven
Member States), contains several provisions prohibiting anticompetitive
conduct.32 Antitrust laws were also adopted in many other developed nations
(for example, Japan in 1947, Australia in 1974, Korea in 1981 and Canada in
1985). In more recent years, antitrust laws have been adopted in many emerging
economies (for example, Mexico in 1992, South Africa in 1998, Russia in 2006,
and China in 2008), as well as in developing nations (for example, Kenya in
1988, Jamaica in 1993, Zambia in 1996, and Indonesia in 1999).
The adoption of antitrust law regimes in emerging economies and in
developing countries can be explained by several factors.33 First, some nations
have adopted antitrust rules within the framework of trade agreements or as
preconditions to joining some trade blocks. Central and Eastern European states
28 Singapore Ministerial Declaration, 20, (Dec 13, 1996), available online at
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minist-e/min96_e/wtodece.htm> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
29 Id.
30 Doha Ministerial Declaration, 23-25 (Nov 14, 2001), available online at
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist._e/min0l-e/mindecle.htm> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
31 See Text of the 'July package'-the General Council's post-Canctin decision of August 1, 2004,
available online at <http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dda-e/draft-text-gc.dg-31julyO4.
e.htm#invest_comp_gpa> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
32 See Treaty Establishing the EC, title VI (cited in note 21).
33 See Geradin, Compelifion Law and Regional Economic Integrafion at 13 (cited in note 10).
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were required, for instance, to adopt a competition law regime in order to join
the EU. Second, institutional donors, such as the World Bank or regional
development banks, often encouraged emerging economies to adopt
competition law regimes and then provided support to these nations to assist
them in setting up the regimes. Third, a number of countries realized that the
adoption of an antitrust law regime would contribute to the competitiveness of
their corporations-thus placing them in a more favorable position to compete
with foreign firms and to attract investments-by protecting a competitive
market structure. Finally, some nations adopted antitrust law regimes to
accompany and help capitalize on the benefits of fundamental economic
measures, such as the liberalization of state monopolies.
Thus, while projects to develop global antitrust law regimes have been
largely shelved, most nations now possess antitrust law regimes and have
established enforcement authorities. Many such regimes have been inspired by
the US and/or the EU antitrust model, but, as will be seen below, the degree of
coherence between these regimes varies considerably.
III. THE PROS AND CONS OF THE DECENTRALIZED
GLOBALIZATION OF ANTITRUST
This process of decentralized globalization, whereby each nation or-in
the case of the EU-group of nations enacts its own antitrust laws and develops
its own enforcement structure, raises a number of issues.
First, it is questionable whether the development of a global competition
law regime, for instance within the framework of the WTO, would have been
preferable. The law and economics of federalism literature, which seeks to
determine the appropriate level at which regulation should be adopted and
enforced,34 identifies a number of circumstances in which centralized regulatory
regimes, comprising harmonized rules enforced through common enforcement
schemes, are preferable to the kind of decentralized regimes that currently
prevail in the antitrust field.35
One such circumstance is when activities carried out in one nation create
externalities negatively affecting other nations.36 Air pollution, which typically
travels across borders, is thus generally better addressed through international
34 See generally Daniel C. Esty and Damien Geradin, eds, Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration:
Comparative Perspectives (Oxford 2001); William W. Bratton, et al, International Regulatory Compettion and
Coordination: Perspectives on Economic Regulation in Europe and the United States (Oxford 1996).
35 See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Law in the United States and the European Communiy: Spillovers,
Cooperation, Rivaly, Institutions, 1992 U Chi Legal F 41 (1992).
36 See Esty and Geradin, Regulatoy Competition and Economic Integration at 33-34 (cited in note 34).
Vol 10 No. 1
The Perils of Antitrust Profiferation
rather than national action. The reason is that the nation in which the pollution
is generated may take insufficient account of the harm suffered by citizens
located in other nations.3" Anticompetitive conduct of firms located in one
nation may also create externalities on consumers located in other nations. This
is, for instance, the case of export cartels. In such a case, much like in the air
pollution example discussed above, the antitrust authorities of the nation in
which the cartelists are located may fail to adequately take into account the
welfare of the consumers of the importing nation(s). This is illustrated by the
fact that the US, the EU, and many other jurisdictions decline to penalize export
cartels.38 The difference with the air pollution example, however, is that export
cartels (in other words the externality) will be sanctioned under the antitrust laws
of the importing jurisdiction that suffers the anticompetitive effects. Thus, a US
cartel that exports to the EU is regulated by EU competition law, while an EU
cartel that exports to the US falls within the purview of, and is assessed pursuant
to, the provisions of US antitrust law. No international action is thus needed to
control the externality in question.39
Another circumstance in which the literature on the vertical allocation of
regulatory powers stipulates that centralized (international) action may be
necessary relates to the so-called "race to the bottom."' ° The race to the bottom
is an issue of grave concern in a variety of regulatory fields, such as corporate
law,4' environmental law,42 labor law,43 and tax law.' Given the mobility of
companies and factories, there exists a general fear among legislators and
regulators that jurisdictions with high standards will find it difficult to maintain
them in the face of threats from their domestic industries to move to low-
standard jurisdictions in order to evade the regulatory burden they might
otherwise face. This threat of industrial migration may trigger a phenomenon
37 Id.
38 See Elhauge and Geradin, GlobalAntitrustLaw and Economics at 1101 (cited in note 1).
39 As will be seen in Section IV below, a decision by the antitrust authority of one nation may generate
externalities on other nations' consumers.
40 See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacifice?: Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of
NationalEnironmentalPoliy, 86 Yale LJ 1196, 1211-12 (1977). But see Richard L. Revesz, Rehabiltating
Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race to the Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
NYU L Rev 1210, 1244-47 (1992).
41 Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation PuZZle, 1J L, Econ, & Org 225 (1985).
42 See Stewart, 86 Yale L J at 1211-12 (cited in note 40).
43 See David Charny, Regulatoy Competition and the Global Coordnation of Labour Standards, in Esty and
Geradin, eds, Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration 311, 324 (cited in note 34).
44 See Daniel Shaviro, Some Observations Concerning Multiju sdictional Tax Competition in Esty and Geradin,
eds, Regulatogy Competition and Economic Integration 49, 62-63 (cited in note 34).
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characterized by competitive deregulation (hence, the term race to the bottom)
as high-standard jurisdictions revise their rules in order to avoid competitive
disadvantages for their corporations.4" While this race dynamic seems to be very
real in the above-mentioned regulatory areas, it is absent in the antitrust field.46
The presence of weak antitrust standards in a given jurisdiction is unlikely to
significantly induce firms to invest in that nation. If firms want to exploit that
nation's consumers, they could take advantage of the antitrust laws to do so
from abroad without investing in the nation. It is also unclear why they would
favor investing or employing in nations that under-regulate anticompetitive
conduct. After all, if their aim is to avoid home-country antitrust review of their
exports, they would also get that if they invested in the US, the EU, or any other
nation that does not ban export cartels. And no matter where they are located,
their anticompetitive export practices would still be subject to antitrust review in
importing nations.
Thus, some of the main rationales for adopting centralized regimes appear
absent in the antitrust field. Even if centralization were desirable in the antitrust
area, however, history shows that developing a global antitrust law regime would
be difficult.47 Several factors impede the development of a global antitrust
regime.
First, nations would have to agree on the content of the global law. While
almost all antitrust regimes contain rules designed to prevent anticompetitive
agreements, abuses of a dominant position, and mergers substantially lessening
competition, the content of these rules may differ. For instance, while
monopolization is an offense under US antitrust law, it does not seem to be
covered by EU competition law.48 In contrast, while EU competition law
prohibits excessive prices, monopoly pricing is not prohibited under the US
Sherman Act.49 Antitrust laws in some nations may also be designed to cover
"unfair" contractual practices or may exempt some industries from their scope.
Some antitrust laws will also ascribe importance to social (non-efficiency related)
considerations, whereas such considerations will have no bearing whatsoever in
an antitrust assessment in most antitrust regimes.
Second, reaching agreement on the manner in which such global rules
would be enforced, if they could even be agreed upon, would also raise
45 Daniel C. Esty and Damien Geradin, Environmental Protection Poades and International Competitiveness: A
Conceptual Framework, 32 J World Trade 5 (1998).
46 See Fox, 75 NYU L Rev at 1789 (cited in note 9).
47 See Section II above.
48 See Elhauge and Geradin, GlobalAntitrust Law and Economics at 254 (cited in note 1).
49 Id at 255.
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considerable difficulties. A centralized enforcement system relying on a global
antitrust authority would be politically unacceptable for the US and other large
jurisdictions. But even if it were acceptable to the main stakeholder nations, the
enforcement structures vary so considerably across nations that it would be hard
to agree on a set of institutional and procedural rules.50 Moreover, a
decentralized system would lead to divergent interpretations of the commonly
agreed rules, unless of course the case law could be harmonized through appeals
lodged before a global antitrust court. It is thus not surprising that the various
attempts made in the past to create a global antitrust regime failed as the level of
consensus needed to agree on such a regime would be particularly hard to
achieve.
A third question raised by this process of decentralized globalization is
whether, in the absence of a proper global antitrust law regime, the world is
better off with the parallel application of over one hundred different antitrust
laws.
There is no doubt that properly structured and enforced antitrust rules will
contribute to consumer welfare in the various nations that have adopted such
rules. Unsurprisingly, enforcement has been modest in many developing
nations.51 The requisite resources are not necessarily available as antitrust
enforcement may not be the primary objective of countries whose citizens suffer
from poverty, unemployment, disease, or malnutrition. But even with a modest
budget, antitrust authorities can often play a useful "competition advocacy" role
by, for instance, making the case for the removal of regulatory or other
restrictions to allow entry in certain sectors of the economy that have been
traditionally sheltered from competition.52 Although one cannot rule out the risk
that developing countries' antitrust authorities can be captured by domestic rent-
seeking groups, they may also play a useful role in dismantling local cartels, or
perhaps with the help of antitrust agencies of Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") countries, protecting their citizens
against international cartels to which low-income countries are particularly
vulnerable.53
50 In the EU the enforcement of antitrust law is essentially administrative in nature, while in the US
enforcement is based to a significant extent on private actions.
51 See Geradin, Competition Law and Regional Economic Integration at 57-86 (cited in note 10).
52 See Armando E. Rodriguez and Malcolm B. Coate, Competition Pofiy in Transiion Economies: The Role of
Competition Advocagy, 23 Brooldyn J Intl L 365, 397-99 (1997).
53 Margaret C. Levenstein, et al, International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of
Effects and Polig Remedies, NBER Working Paper No 9511 at 40 (Feb 2003), available online at
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w9511.pdf> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
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While there is a concern that newly adopted antitrust rules remain a dead
letter in many countries, many nations with limited experience in the antitrust
field are now taking things very seriously. Countries like Korea and Brazil-and
the same is expected to happen in China-are particularly active and clearly want
to join the "super league" of antitrust enforcement agencies. These agencies,
which enjoy significant resources and are run by well-educated leaders, will
typically go beyond mere competition advocacy tasks and consider the full range
of conduct that may raise antitrust issues, including abuse of dominance and
mergers. Their willingness to deal with complex dominance cases has not gone
unnoticed and some of these authorities have been drawn into complex abuse
cases, such as Microsof5 4 and Intel.55 While antitrust intervention may be
misguided or pushed too far by excessively enthusiastic officials, the
development of antitrust regimes in these countries has more likely than not
benefited domestic consumers and the economy as a whole by forcing firms to
compete with resulting efficiency benefits.
The process of decentralized globalization of antitrust has, however, posed
considerable difficulties for global corporations. While a couple of decades ago,
multinational corporations were few in number and most of them originated
from the US or the EU, the situation has considerably evolved. The
internationalization of markets means that many corporations, large and small,
are now operating on a global scale. Moreover, the strong growth of a number
of countries in Asia and Latin America means that global corporations are now
headquartered in cities like Mexico City, Mumbai, Sao Paulo, Seoul, Shanghai, or
Taipei.56
In a world where most countries have antitrust laws in place, global firms
face a number of relatively well-known challenges. First, the relatively
uncoordinated adoption of antitrust regimes enforced by antitrust authorities,
whose methods and procedures vary considerably, increases the cost of doing
business. Keeping up with the antitrust developments taking place in numerous
countries is costly. While this is a cost that can easily be absorbed by corporate
giants like IBM or Exxon, it may be more difficult to absorb for smaller,
specialized firms. Rules applying to vertical restrictions may, for instance, vary
considerably across countries and they may not always be intelligible to in-house
lawyers who have to cover several jurisdictions. In the case of mergers, the need
54 In relation to the KFTC case, see note 8.
55 In relation to the KFTC case, see Corrective Measures against Intel's Abuse of Dominance, available online at
<http://eng.ftc.go.kr/files/bbs/2008/ntel%2Case(08.6.)l.pdf> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
56 See, for example, TATA Group in Mumbai, AmBev in Sao Paulo, Samsung and Hyundai Corporation
in Seoul, and Lenovo in Shanghai.
Vol. 10 No. I
The Perils ofAntitrust Proliferation Geradin
to file the proposed transaction in numerous jurisdictions may also represent a
significant cost.
57
Second, the process of decentralized globalization also increases the cost
and complexity of litigation. The in-house lawyers of firms investigated for
alleged anticompetitive conduct in several jurisdictions have to play an
immensely complicated coordination role to ensure that their external counsel in
one jurisdiction do not take positions that could damage their case in other
jurisdictions. These firms also face a particularly daunting task as they deal with
agencies whose procedures are often hard to comprehend. For instance, the way
an investigation is conducted in Korea or Japan is radically different from the
way it is conducted in the US, if only because there is less transparency. These
countries do not have a tradition of discussion and disagreement with private
parties in the context of public decisionmaking. Hence, the dialogue that
typically takes place between investigated firms and antitrust authorities, such as
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), or
the European Commission, is, in Asian countries, largely absent.
It is hard, of course, to feel sorry for firms that engage in price-fixing
and/or market-sharing and have to face the costly consequences of their actions,
but in many instances global corporations will be investigated for conduct that
may not necessarily be illegal in their own jurisdiction and whose alleged
anticompetitive effects may be subject to debate (for example, loyalty rebates).
In such cases, parallel investigations in several jurisdictions may significantly
distract management and generate staggering legal costs.
Third, the parallel application of different antitrust regimes to a given
agreement or conduct increases the risk of contradictory decisions. As noted
above, even sophisticated antitrust law regimes, like those in the US and the EU,
may diverge on a number of issues, creating the risk that similar practices will be
treated differently across jurisdictions. Moreover, even when the relevant legal
doctrines do not differ, their application can lead to conflicting conclusions as,
for instance, illustrated in the GE-Honeywell merger. 8 Similarly, the De
57 According to a PricewaterhouseCoopers report of 2003 the typical multi-jurisdictional deal involves
eight completed or considered filings and leads to, on average, E3.3 million in external merger review
costs. See A Tax on Merger? Surveying the Time and Cost to Business of Multi jurisdictional Merger Reviews 4
(2003), available online at <http://www.globalcompetidonforum.org/PWCMerger_CostStudy_
ReportFinal_2003_Jun.pdf> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
58 As regards the EU, see Commission Decision Declacing the Incompatibility with the Common Market of a
Concentration, Case No CONIP/M.2220 General Electric/Honeywell (July 3, 2001), available online at
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/dcisions/m
2 2 2 0_en.pdf> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
In relation to the US, see Deborah P. Majoras, GE-Honywell: The US Decision, Address Before
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Havilland-ATR merger was approved by Canada but prohibited by the EU.59
Nor are international conflicts limited to mergers. In relation to the loyalty
discount dispute between Virgin Airlines and British Airways, the EU
condemned the very conduct that was deemed permissible under US antitrust
law.60 And sometimes a conflict in remedial approaches can result. Thus,
although Microsoft's efforts to bundle other software into its operating system
have been condemned both in the US and EU, the US was not willing to impose
the sort of extensive remedies the EU imposed.6'
Finally, there is always the danger that some antitrust decisions will be
driven by protectionist motives. Although antitrust authorities are typically
sheltered from political and business-interest interferences, this is not always the
case. The very idea of setting up "independent" regulators is new in many
countries, especially those that have operated under government planning for
most, or all, of the twentieth century. The difficulty with antitrust rules, of
course, is that they are drafted in broad terms and thus leave a great deal of
discretionary power to the enforcing authorities. These authorities are typically
subject to judicial review, but often generalist courts lack the relevant skills to
properly review complex antitrust decisions, and thus tend to defer to
specialized authorities. This is not to say that antitrust authorities are generally
"captured," but when the welfare effects of a conduct are ambiguous and the
standards applied are amorphous, as is often the case with unilateral conduct, the
danger of political and business-related interferences is particularly grave.62
Antitrust Law Section of the State Bar of Georgia (Nov 29, 2001), available online at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/pubic/speeches/9893.htm> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
59 As regards the EU, see Commission Decision Declaring the Incompatibility with the Common Market of a
Concentration, Case No IV/M053 Aerospatiale-Alenia/De Havilland (Oct 2, 1991), available online at
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m53_en.pdf> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
60 Compare British Airways v Commission, 2003 ECR 11-5917 (2003), with Virgin At! Airways v Briisb
Airways, 257 F3d 256 (2d Cir 2001).
61 See note 8.
62 In a recently published paper, Hew Pate (former US Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust)
recommended that the Chinese authorities in charge of enforcing the AML should focus on the
clearest antitrust missions, such as breaking down cartels. In contrast, he observed,
Pursuing the more amorphous concepts inherent in merger review and
monopolization analysis leaves much more room for mistaken and arbitrary
decisions. Decision making under the vague and subjective standards that
plague unilateral conduct in the United States and Europe also presents special
hazards for a system struggling with corruption and lack of independence.
Vague standards are an easy refuge for corrupt decision-making.
See Hew Pate, Wbat I Heard in the Great Hall of the People--Reaistic Expectations of Chinese Antitrust, 75
Antitrust L J 195, 209 (2008). While corruption may be a particularly acute issue in China, vague
standards are nevertheless a fertile ground for politicized decisionmaking.
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These issues will become increasingly serious in the years to come as
markets become even more global and antitrust authorities all around the world
become increasingly eager to enforce their domestic antitrust rules. But besides
these well-known issues, the multiplicity of coexisting antitrust regimes has
created another, more insidious problem for global corporations-when several
antitrust regimes apply to a given conduct, the most aggressive regime always
wins. This issue is dealt with in Section IV.
IV. THE "STRICTEST REGIME WINS" PROBLEM AND THE RISK
OF OVERREGULATION
The strictest regime wins problem can easily be illustrated in the merger-
control arena. If a transatlantic merger is reviewed in the US and in the EU, and
if the US authorities approve it while the EU authorities prohibit it, the parties
to the merger will have to abandon the transaction. This type of situation is rare,
but when it occurs, it means that a merger considered to be procompetitive and
beneficial to US consumers will be blocked because the EU authorities think
otherwise. In this hypothetical case, the EU position may be perfectly justified
because, while the merger may generate significant efficiencies in the US, it may
also create significant anticompetitive effects in the EU. Likewise, the conflicting
decisions may also be due to conflicting policy objectives. Although the merger
may produce similar effects in the EU and the US, the European Commission
may simply take a stricter stance on the transaction. In that case, the EU would
basically deny the US the beneficial procompetitive effects of the transaction,
contrary to the policy preferences of its antitrust authorities. Fortunately, in the
merger field, such situations are rare as both the US and the EU authorities
share the same standard of review, and cooperate closely on mergers that have
effects on both sides of the Atlantic.
But conflicts may appear in a less dramatic, though equally serious way in
other areas of antitrust law, such as abuse of dominance. Let us assume, for
instance, that due to consumer demand, Firm A decides to integrate a piece of
software with a piece of hardware.63 The integrated product is sold worldwide to
the satisfaction of thousands of customers. Firm B, which produces and sells the
software in question, but does not produce the hardware, observes a serious
reduction in its software sales because customers prefer the integrated product.
It then decides to lodge complaints before the antitrust authorities of
jurisdictions X, Y and Z on the ground that A's behavior amounts to
63 Consumer demand for mobile phones with enhanced software functionality, for example, is likely to
continue growing. In this regard, witness the success of Apple's iPhone.
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anticompetitive tying. The antitrust authorities of jurisdictions X and Y carry out
an effects-based test and reach the correct conclusion that the conduct in
question is procompetitive since it generates numerous efficiencies that benefit
customers. The antitrust authority of jurisdiction Z, which is less sophisticated,
follows a formalistic approach and, without much analysis, reaches the
conclusion that the integration of the software with the hardware amounts to
anticompetitive tying. It adopts an order mandating A to cease its behavior and
fines it $25 million. The fine is obviously bad news, but more serious
consequences may ensue. Jurisdiction Z represents a significant market for A,
but A is also concerned that investigations may be initiated in other jurisdictions.
The firm has no choice but to abandon the production and sale of its integrated
product, hence depriving thousands of customers of the efficiencies recognized
by the more sophisticated antitrust authorities of X and Y. Even worse, the
decision of the antitrust authority of Z, which has been highly publicized by the
complainants, has an (intense) chilling effect on the industry's trend towards
integrating software with hardware in order to realize efficiencies.
This example shows that the decision of one antitrust authority, however
misguided, may not only potentially freeze technological innovation in the
country to which it belongs, but may also produce such effects in other
countries. This is true even if two-but it could also be ten-other antitrust
authorities considered that the conduct in question was not only legitimate, but
would also benefit consumers. This example forces us somehow to reconsider
the position held in Section III that the problem of externality that underpins
the rationale for centralized action in many regulatory areas is absent from the
antitrust field. In this case, the antitrust authority of Z creates an externality in
that it deprives consumers of X and Y of the efficiencies recognized by their
own antitrust authorities. The problem, as we have seen in Section II, is that
attempts to centralize regulatory decisions have failed in the antitrust field, and
there is no prospect that further progress in this regard will be made in the near
future.
A further illustration of this problem can be found in the area of rebates.64
Granting rebates is a strategy used by dominant and non-dominant firms to
increase their sales. Unconditional rebates are a form of price cut,6" while
64 See Darnien Geradin, A Proposed Test for Separating Pro-competilive Conditional Rebates from Anti-competitive
Ones, World Competition (forthcoming 2009), available online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract.id 1315292> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
65 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Trea to Exclusionary Abuses 137
(Dec 2005), available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/others/
discpaper2005.pdf> (visited Apr 16, 2009) ("Unconditional rebates, while granted to certain customers
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conditional rebates seek to reward customers for their loyalty.66 Economists have
long recognized that rebates are a source of efficiencies because, for instance,
they allow firms to increase output, gain scale and recover their fixed costs more
expeditiously.6" Rebates are typically not imposed by suppliers, even dominant
ones, but negotiated with customers. In some cases, large customers force their
suppliers to grant them rebates on pain of shifting their business to other
suppliers. While rebates are generally procompetitive, they may, however, be
used by dominant firms to foreclose their competitors.
There are very intense scholarly debates on the circumstances in which
conditional rebates may have foreclosure effects, and the positions taken by
antitrust authorities tend to vary considerably across jurisdictions. The European
Commission and the EU courts have, for instance, traditionally analyzed
conditional rebates under a restrictive, form-based approach that does not sit
well with modern economics.68 US agencies and US federal courts have,
however, taken a more flexible approach towards rebates, especially when it
comes to single-product rebates, 69 as they have been concerned with the risk that
intervention on the basis of antitrust rules might forestall legitimate price
competition.7 ° Interestingly, both the European Commission and the DOJ have
recently released guidance documents explaining the way they intend to apply
their respective provisions dealing with abuses of a dominant position to a range
of unilateral practices including rebates and discounts. While the European
Commission took a step towards the adoption of an effects-based approach to
the assessment of conditional rebates that is better in line with the approach
taken by the US courts,7 ' the Commission's Guidance Paper remains more
and not to others, are granted for every purchase of these particular customers, independently of their
purchasing behavior.").
66 Id ("Conditional rebates are granted to customers to reward a certain (purchasing) behavior of these
customers.").
67 See Derek Ridyard, Exclusionary Pricing and Price Discrimination Abuses under Arlicle 82-An Economic
Analysis, 23(6) Eur Competition L R 286, 291 (2002).
68 Geradin, A Proposed Test for Separating Pro-competilive Conditional Rebates from Anti-compeilive Ones (cited in
note 64).
69 Id.
70 See, for instance, Bary Wrigbt v ITT Grinnell, 724 F2d 227, 231 (1 st Cir 1983), stating
After all, lower prices help consumers. The competitive marketplace that the
antitrust laws encourage and protect is characterized by firms willing and able
to cut prices in order to take customers from their rivals.... Thus, a legal
precedent or rule of law that prevents a firm from unilaterally cutting its prices
risks interference with one of the Sherman Act's most basic objectives: the low
price levels that one would find in well-functioning competitive markets.
71 See European Commission, Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Arlicle 82 EC
Treaty to Abusive Exclusionagy Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (Dec 3, 2008), available online at
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restrictive than US law. Here again, global corporations may be faced with a
situation whereby one rebate regime may be lawful under US law and unlawful
under EU law. And this example ignores the fact that conditional rebates may
also fall within the jurisdiction of other antitrust authorities. Intel has, for
instance, been recently condemned by the Korea Free Trade Commission on the
ground that it had granted anticompetitive rebates to some of its Korean
customers.
One could, of course, argue that this problem may be easier to address
than the product-integration problem discussed above, as the corporation in
question, which for the sake of this example is dominant on the relevant market,
could grant rebates to its US customers and not to its European (or Korean)
customers. But this approach is unlikely to work as it may not necessarily be easy
to distinguish between US, European, or other nations' customers, as some of
these customers may be truly global firms. Moreover, granting rebates to some
customers while refusing them to other customers may trigger complex
discrimination issues that may harm the corporation's commercial reputation.
Faced with such difficulties, the global corporation may simply decide to play it
safe and grant to all its customers, wherever they may be located, rebates that
comply with the most stringent antitrust regimes, even if this prevents it from
realizing efficiencies and deprives its customers of the benefit of lower prices.
As is illustrated by the above developments, the proliferation of antitrust
laws and authorities around the world creates a serious concern that firms might
be dissuaded from adopting procompetitive behaviors due to the risk that such
behaviors may create antitrust liability in one or several jurisdictions that take a
particularly restrictive, and in some cases misguided, approach to the conduct in
question. This concern would not be so serious if corporations could carve out
the jurisdictions in question by ceasing to supply customers located in those
jurisdictions or treating them in a different manner to avoid liability. In a
globalized world, however, such an approach may not be easy. Moreover, some
of the most aggressive jurisdictions when it comes to antitrust enforcement are
also among the world's largest markets. For obvious reasons, a large US or
European corporation could not reasonably decide to carve out Brazil, China, or
Korea simply because it has a distaste for their antitrust laws or the way
domestic authorities enforce those laws.
Besides harming the welfare of global corporations and their customers,
the strictest regime wins problem may have broader policy consequences, as it
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/anitrust/art82/guidance.pdf> (visited Apr 16, 2009); US Dept of
Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act (2008), available
online at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
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may effectively deny some nations of the beneficial procompetitive effects of
some behaviors or transactions. This may be a source of international tension,
which can be illustrated by the statement issued by Tom Barnett, the then
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, after the Court of First Instance of the
European Communities ("CFI") issued its decision affirming the substance of
the European Commission's March 2004 decision against Microsoft. 2 This
statement observed that: "[T]he standard applied to unilateral conduct by the
CFI, rather than helping consumers, may have the unfortunate consequence of
harming consumers by chilling innovation and discouraging competition." 3 The
European position was then contrasted to the US approach whereby:
In the United States, the antitrust laws are enforced to protect consumers by
protecting competition, not competitors. In the absence of demonstrable
consumer harm, all companies, including dominant firms, are encouraged to
compete vigorously. U.S. courts recognize the potential benefits to
consumers when a company, including a dominant company, makes
unilateral business decisions, for example to add features to its popular
products or license its intellectual property to rivals, or to refuse to do so.7 4
While this statement was not necessarily wise,75 it clearly conveyed the
frustration felt by the US authorities with respect to the intervention of the
European Commission and the CFI.
There is no indication that the strictest regime wins problem is likely to
disappear in the forthcoming years, and some factors suggest that it could even
be exacerbated by the implementation of the Chinese AML, which has among
its objectives promoting the "healthy development of the socialist market
economy. 76 Can something be done to address the problem? Short of a global
antitrust regime that would regulate mergers, agreements, and unilateral conduct
72 See US Dept of Justice, Press Release, Assistant Attorny Generalfor Antitrust, Thomas 0. Barnett, Issues
Statement on European Microsoft Dedsion (Sept 17, 2007), available online at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2007/226070.htm> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Criticizing an independent court decision was pointless.
76 See AML, art 1, which provides: "This law is enacted for the purpose of preventing and restraining
Monopolistic conducts, protecting fair competition in the market, enhancing economic efficiency,
safeguarding the interests of consumers and social public interest, promoting the healthy development
of the socialist market economy." Article 1 seems to reflect a certain tension between various
objectives that are attributed to the AML. On the one hand, this provision refers to the traditional
objectives of competition, such as the promotion of economic efficiency and consumer welfare. On
the other hand, the promotion of "fair market competition" is not particularly reassuring as it could
open the door to a range of non-efficiency-related considerations. Some observers have pointed to
the risk that the A"ML be used for achieving industrial policy objectives, such as the protection of small
and medium-size companies, the protection of domestic enterprises from foreign rivals, or the
promotion of domestic innovation.
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that produces effects across jurisdictions (an approach that is neither politically
feasible nor necessarily desirable), there appears to be no clear solution. As US
and European antitrust authorities are the most widely respected and influential
regulators in the world, and as US and European corporations are the most
widely exposed to the concern expressed above, they should take the lead in
exploring strategies to ensure greater coherence in the way antitrust laws are
applied all around the world. In this respect, the following efforts should be
undertaken (or if already undertaken, should be redoubled).
First, US antitrust authorities and the European Commission should act as
role models for the rest of the world's antitrust authorities. The decisions and
policy guidelines they adopt are widely read and are a source of inspiration. The
US and European antitrust authorities should take this factor into consideration.
In this respect, the Guidance Paper on the enforcement of Article 82 EC issued
by the European Commission is a source of disappointment. While the
Guidance Paper seeks to promote a more modern effects-based approach to the
assessment of dominant firms' behaviors, it continues to take particularly
restrictive views on a variety of issues and fails to provide dominant firms with
proper "safe harbors."77 In fact, one of the objectives that seems to have been
pursued by the Commission with this Guidance Paper is to leave things "open"
so that its ability to intervene against dominant firms is left unconstrained. The
US DOJ Report on Single-Firm Conduct is, in that respect, a much more
impressive achievement, as it provides a cautious assessment of firms' unilateral
conducts and contains proper safe harbors. Thus, it offers helpful guidance to
firms whose behavior may fall foul of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The
problem is that EU competition law may be of greater appeal as a source of
inspiration to foreign antitrust authorities since it leaves them greater flexibility
to intervene against dominant firms. In this respect, EU abuse-of-dominance
law has become the dominant source of influence in the world. Many antitrust
and economics experts in the EU would have liked the Commission to take a
less restrictive position in its Guidance Paper, although the fact it promotes an
economically-oriented approach is a step forward and shows not only the
national competition authorities of the Member States of the EU, but also the
rest of the world's competition authorities, the way to go.
Second, as remarkably exposed by FTC Chairman Bill Kovacic, leading
antitrust agencies, such as those of the US and the EU, should learn to evaluate
their performance not only in terms of outputs (such as the number of decisions
adopted, the number of settlements reached), but also in terms of process (such
77 See Geradin, A Proposed Test for Separating Pro-competitive Conditional Rebates from Anti-compelitive Ones (cited
in note 64).
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as the quality of the agency's internal operations, and the improvement of its
intellectual infrastructure).7 ' There is a natural tendency, of course, especially
amongst newly created antitrust authorities, to focus on outputs rather than
quality. Quality is usually difficult to measure, but also there is the perception
that those who take decisions on the budget of the authorities or appoint (or
reappoint) commissioners may be more impressed by numbers than the
intellectual rigor of the authority's investigative and decisionmaking processes.
The various internal reforms carried out under the leadership of European
Commissioner Monti, which, for instance, led to the creation of a Chief
Economist's office and the setting up of internal review processes such as the
panels of devil's advocates, were very positive developments, which should
ideally be exported to other antitrust agencies.79 In this respect, the best hope
that antitrust authorities around the world will progressively converge around
modern standards of assessment of corporate conduct is through the growing
importance of economic analysis in antitrust analysis, a factor which has
introduced greater analytical rigor in antitrust analysis.
Third, the US and the EU authorities should continue to play a major role
in international antitrust fora like the Competition Committee of the OECD80 or
the International Competition Network ("ICN").8" Members of the ICN have
carried out a variety of substantive projects on mergers, cartels, and unilateral
conduct. If anything, greater focus should be placed on the procedural aspects
distinguishing US antitrust law, or to some extent EU competition law, from the
antitrust regimes of other jurisdictions, particularly in Asia. These differences in
procedural aspects relate to the degree of transparency of the investigative and
decisionmaking processes. It is a terrifying prospect for global firms to be
investigated in jurisdictions where they may not have the ability to receive copies
of complaints that have been lodged by competitors and/or have only a limited
ability to file their observations during the investigative process. Lack of
transparency may not only violate the rights of investigated firms, as they are
generally recognized in most jurisdictions, but it may also negatively affect the
78 See William E. Kovacic, Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the Peformance of Competition Poliy
Authorities, 31 J Corp L 503, 506 (2006).
79 See European Commission, Press Release, Commission Adopts Comprehensive reform of EU me ger control,
IP/02/1856 (Dec 11, 2002), available online at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/02/1856&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guilanguage=en> (visited Apr 16,
2009).
80 For further information on the Competition Committee of the OECD, see
<http://www.oecd.org/home/0,2987,en_2649 20118511 -1 1 l,00.html> (visited Apr 16,2009).
81 For further information on the International Competition Network, see
<http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
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quality of the decisionmaking, as the quality of a decision is often linked to the
ability of parties to make their views known.
Finally, besides multilateral initiatives, bilateral contacts may also be
important. 2 The US and EU authorities meet on a regular basis with their
counterparts from other large agencies. These meetings offer a unique
opportunity to positively influence the processes of other agencies, not so much
because these agencies should not be free to make their own decisions, but
because there may be instances where their lack of experience and/or eagerness
to act swiftly and strongly may make them overlook critical issues. One critical
component of this interagency dialogue should relate to procedural aspects as
firms subject to investigations in foreign jurisdictions should be granted all
necessary rights to defend themselves. This should include, at a minimum, the
right to detailed information about the allegations and evidence in the
investigation, and the right to engage with the case team throughout the
investigation, including during the critical period prior to the formulation of
tentative, preliminary, or recommended findings and conclusions. While most
jurisdictions that have recently adopted competition laws apply substantive
provisions that are relatively similar to those applied in the US or the EU, the
procedural framework is often underdeveloped and out of line with best
practices. This interagency dialogue is also particularly important when a
corporation is under investigation in one nation for behavior that would not be
deemed anticompetitive in its country of origin or in the majority of countries
having antitrust laws. In such cases the risk is particularly high that a decision of
an antitrust authority in one jurisdiction creates negative externalities affecting
consumers of other nations by depriving them of procompetitive efficiencies.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, there is no drastic and unique way to address the strictest regime
wins problem described above. This problem is a by-product of the
decentralized globalization of antitrust which has taken place over the last two
decades. While some nations thought that the adoption of antitrust rules in fast-
growing economies would benefit their corporations by ensuring that the
barriers to entry removed by free trade agreements would not be recreated
through restrictions of competition, they probably overlooked the fact that these
very corporations could be targeted by long, drawn-out investigations, leading to
82 The importance of bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements, for example, has been highlighted on a
multitude of occasions. See, for example, Joel I. Klein, The InternationalZation of Antitrust: Bilateral and
Multilateral Responses, Address Before the European University Institute, (June 13, 1997) available
online at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/pubic/speeches/1580.htm> (visited Apr 16, 2009).
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decisions that could potentially affect corporate behavior beyond the jurisdiction
in question. Absent a single solution, it seems that efforts designed to improve
the intellectual infrastructure of the world's antitrust authorities, as well as the
procedures they follow in the investigative and decisionmaking processes,
represent the best way to go.
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